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Abstract
Advocates of a global democratic parliament have expressed hopes that this would not only 
legitimize global governance in procedural terms, but also bring about more cosmopolitan 
policies. They point to the European Parliament as an example of a successful real existing 
democratic parliament beyond the state with cosmopolitan intent. We analyse plenary 
debates in the United Nations General Assembly and the European Parliament about the 
issues of climate change, human rights, migration, trade and European integration between 
2004 and 2011 to study the nature of opposition to cosmopolitanism within these two 
assemblies. We find more vocal and better-organized opposition to cosmopolitanism in 
the European Parliament than in the United Nations General Assembly. We demonstrate 
the plausibility that direct and more proportional mechanisms of delegation and 
accountability in the case of the European Parliament account for this observed difference. 
Should further research confirm these initial findings, advocates of a global democratic 
parliament may find that an empowered democratic World Parliament would support less 
cosmopolitan policies than the current United Nations General Assembly.
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Introduction
Advocates of a global democratic parliament point out that many of the protests against 
globalization derive from dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic legitimacy of global 
governance (Archibugi, 2010; Archibugi and Held, 1995; Falk and Strauss, 2001). These 
protests from the Left, but also anti-globalization movements of the Right, could be 
accommodated if citizens had a better say in world politics. The increasing ‘politiciza-
tion’ of international organizations due to their rising authority (Zürn et al., 2012) might 
thus be matched by increasing democratic legitimacy.
At the same time, there is the hope that a genuinely global parliament could be a 
champion of more cosmopolitan policies that take the individual human being — wher-
ever he or she may be — as the ultimate unit of moral concern (Nussbaum, 2010; Pogge, 
1992). Such a universalist and individualist world view fosters demands for policies that, 
in one way or another, imply an integration of formerly national societies — for example, 
through the enforcement of human rights across the globe, through protecting the global 
environment and combating climate change, or by welcoming the free movement of 
people across borders for political or economic reasons.
Those campaigning for a global parliament as the would-be champion of human 
rights and sustainable development, like the ‘Campaign for a United Nations 
Parliamentary Assembly’ (UNPA, 2015) or ‘World Parliament’ (WP, 2015), imply that 
the two quests of global democracy and cosmopolitan policies will easily go hand in 
hand. As political scientists, we can question this underlying assumption. What would 
happen if we were to create a democratic World Parliament or democratize the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA)? Will it, indeed, become a champion of cosmopoli-
tan policies as the advocates hope? Unfortunately, no neat empirical answer lies readily 
available to these big counterfactual questions. However, we can look to existing institu-
tions and ask what their workings may tell us about the potential of a global parliament.
Against sceptics (e.g. Dahl, 1999), cosmopolitan democrats point to the success story 
of the European Parliament (EP) as a democratic assembly beyond the state (Archibugi, 
1995: 139; Falk and Strauss, 2001: 217). Our research empirically probes this alleged 
success. To get a glimpse of a likely scenario regarding a global parliament, we set out to 
compare the currently existing UNGA, as the closest proxy to a global assembly, to the 
EP, as the currently best-established democratic assembly beyond the state. We draw on 
cleavage literature documenting a growing divide between cosmopolitan advocates of 
globalization and their various communitarian opponents, and relate this to global gov-
ernance. We thus analyse whether democratic mechanisms may affect the conflict pat-
terns between cosmopolitans and their opponents, assuming that this also affects the 
nature of the policies that international organizations adopt. To enable empirical research, 
we ask, first, to what extent international assemblies feature conflict between cosmopoli-
tans and their opponents. Second, we investigate what effects democratic mechanisms of 
accountability and proportionality have on this conflict. More precisely, we analyse 
debates and claims-making about globalization issues within the UNGA and the EP, and 
the patterns of conflict formation therein.
The next section presents our theoretical underpinning at the intersection of the litera-
tures on cleavages and on global democracy. It formulates four expectations that inform 
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our empirical analysis. These expectations posit, first, the mobilization of a cleavage 
dividing cosmopolitan and opposing communitarian positions. Second, following Zürn 
(2014), we expect to find a cosmopolitan bias dominating in international assemblies on 
this division. Third, based on principal–agent theory, we argue that accountability mech-
anisms affect the force of this bias. Fourth, and finally, we posit that the proportionality 
in the election system is a second factor affecting the balance between cosmopolitan and 
communitarian positions. Subsequently, the research design and our method of claims 
analysis are explained. The results presented in the next section lend support to these four 
expectations, though the degree of cleavage mobilization varies in the two assemblies. 
Finally, we discuss the limitations of our research design before drawing conclusions and 
discussing their implications for cosmopolitan democracy. This certainly does not pro-
vide a definitive answer to the big question of whether an empowered and democratized 
World Parliament would turn out to be a force for cosmopolitan policies — such as pro-
tecting human rights and the global environment — but it does provide a thoroughly 
grounded piece of the puzzle.
Theory
This section focuses on manifestations of cleavage formation within international assem-
blies. The logic behind this is simple. We assume that the cosmopolitan nature of policies 
adopted or supported by international assemblies depends on the weakness of opposition 
to them within these assemblies. The more numerous and the more coherent or organized 
opposition to cosmopolitanism is in international assemblies, the less cosmopolitan the 
policies supported by this assembly will be. We thus approach the question of whether a 
global parliament will further the cosmopolitan cause by empirically gauging the mani-
festation of cleavage formation within assemblies. First, this section posits the possibility 
of the development of a cosmopolitan versus communitarian cleavage around globaliza-
tion issues. Second, it introduces transnational parliaments as a forum for manifesting 
this cleavage in the form of speech acts. Third, our four expectations on how the cleavage 
plays out at this level are formulated, including the expected effects of accountability 
mechanisms and proportionality in the election system.
A globalization cleavage?
Issues of globalization, defined as exchanges of goods, services, people, political authority 
and norms across borders (Held et al., 1999), are a major bone of contention. The terms of 
cooperation have to be negotiated, and not everyone is convinced that the benefits provided 
by open borders in terms of consumption, travel, prosperity or otherwise outweigh the 
costs in terms of job insecurity, international crime, loss of cultural distinctiveness and loss 
of sovereignty. Western Europe, where countries rank among the most open and interna-
tionally interwoven (Dreher et al., 2008), features a growing division between winners and 
losers of globalization. It pits those favouring international integration against those favour-
ing the demarcation of the nation-state (Kriesi et al., 2008). Once these conflict lines in 
society translate into politics in the form of politically mobilized dividing lines (Bartolini, 
2000: 19), we can speak of a ‘cleavage’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). We suggest that the 
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conflict between advocates and critics of open borders extends far beyond a narrow eco-
nomic understanding of globalization. Rather, it constitutes a cleavage encompassing many 
issues surrounding transactions, movements and communication more broadly. In particu-
lar, the issues of immigration and European integration form the backbone of this cleavage 
within Western European societies, with citizens who oppose both clearly distinguishable 
from those supporting them (Kriesi et al. , 2008, 2012). On first analysis, this cleavage can-
not be neatly accommodated in other cleavages based on class or religion. We suggest that 
it may serve as the basis for a new, distinct cleavage, which develops along the lines of 
cosmopolitan and communitarian inclinations. Whereas cosmopolitans clearly emphasize 
rights and inclusion beyond nation-state borders based on a universal and generic under-
standing of individuals as units of moral concern, communitarians insist on the importance 
of the community for the entitlement to rights and the acknowledgement of a heterogene-
ous world with morally meaningful boundaries (Brown, 1992; Zürn, 2014: 64). That is, 
while communitarian critics of globalization may come in various guises, they consider the 
social surrounding of the individual as essential to his or her identity, and their beliefs of 
what is just are bound to specific communities. Hence, the realization of justice becomes 
restricted to these communities that delimit identities and beliefs (Sandel, 1998 [1982]; 
Walzer, 1983). While, in Europe, communitarianism may often be synonymous with 
nationalism (Bauman, 1995), there are forms of opposition to globalization that do not take 
the nation as a container of justice. The Mexican Zapatistas, for example, campaigned as 
much against the Mexican government as they did against the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Islamists aiming to unite the ummah do not care much for national-
ity either (Castells, 2010). We therefore rely on the labels of cosmopolitanism and com-
munitarianism — rather than nationalism (Kriesi et al., 2012) or sovereigntism (Azmanova, 
2011) — to capture the advocates of globalization and their various opponents (cf. Zürn 
and De Wilde, 2013). If, indeed, a globalization cleavage is in the making, and opposing 
views in society are politically mobilized by opposing elite factions, these can be expected 
to unfold at different levels (Zürn, 2014). Hence, based on the hypothesis of a globalization 
cleavage, we would expect to find evidence of controversial debate and opposing coalition 
formation within international assemblies. This is the subject of this article.
The role of transnational parliaments in cleavage mobilization
International assemblies, such as the UNGA or the EP, are key institutions in interna-
tional organizations (Grant and Keohane, 2005: 37). These assemblies combine func-
tions of public deliberation in terms of the open and publicly voiced1 exchanges of 
positions on issues by a variety of representatives with (limited) decision-making pow-
ers. On budgetary matters, for example, assemblies tend to have a veto power and the 
EP’s powers extend considerably beyond that (Rittberger, 2005). In this sense of com-
bining public deliberation with decision-making, these institutions can be understood as 
‘strong publics’ (Fraser, 1992: 134) that function as platforms of public preference for-
mation and aggregation, on the one hand, and as intermediaries between institutions 
with executive powers and the wider audience, on the other. With citizens increasingly 
interested in and divided over globalization issues (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2011), assemblies 
present a pivotal arena for reflecting societal conflict and, thus, cleavage mobilization 
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at the international level. Therefore, they are important arenas to assess the existence of 
cosmopolitan discourse, conflict and anti-globalization voice in global governance.
In terms of voting patterns, the literature has already documented clear patterns of 
conflict in the UNGA (Voeten, 2000) and the EP (Hix et al., 2006), but much less is 
known about what is said in the plenary debates (but see Binder and Heupel, 2014; Lord 
and Tamvaki, 2013). Speech acts in international assemblies are a potent source of infor-
mation to assess if and how citizens’ preferences are reflected on the international level. 
Representatives may use public speech acts to argue their cases, shape international 
norms and garner outside support for their policies. Even if plenary statements include 
‘generous doses of posturing and pretense’ (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2004: 263), they 
contribute to the establishment of public discourse, setting the limits of what are gener-
ally acceptable norms (Risse, 2000), and may lead to ‘rhetorical entrapment’ 
(Schimmelfennig, 2001). Our research seeks to make these verbalized positions by rep-
resentatives in international assemblies accessible with respect to a cleavage along cos-
mopolitan and communitarian division lines.
Formulation of expectations
It is by no means straightforward how division lines on globalization translate to debates 
in international assemblies. The cleavage could unfold in similar ways at different levels 
(Zürn, 2014: 65). In that case, we would find opponents and proponents of globalization 
among national and international elites as we do among citizens. On the other hand, it 
has been argued that the conflict between cosmopolitans and communitarians essentially 
approximates an elite–mass divide (Teney and Helbling, 2014), where elites form a con-
sensual block in favour of more integration (Calhoun, 2002) and masses oppose it. If this 
holds true, we should find a more consensual debate in the plenaries of international 
assemblies praising and advocating globalization since all representatives within them 
belong to this international elite. This may be explained by a socializing effect of the 
international environment in which representatives operate (Checkel, 1998), especially 
when they are institutionally mandated to foster global (or regional) cooperation. It may 
also be explained by the elites pursuing their own rational interests as highly educated, 
affluent, multilingual individuals ideally placed to reap the benefits provided by globali-
zation. Either way, it is plausible that representatives operating within international 
organizations have cosmopolitan preferences. Furthermore, it can be expected that the 
more leeway these parliamentarians have to defend their own positions unchecked by 
citizens, the more cosmopolitan bias should become manifest in the assemblies. This 
expectation is related to principal–agent theory in predicting that representatives in inter-
national assemblies pursue their own cosmopolitan preferences, unless delegation and 
accountability mechanisms that force them to represent the interests of their constituen-
cies are in place (McCubbins et al., 1987; Pollack, 1997). If representatives face the 
prospect of electoral punishment, they can be expected to deviate less from the prefer-
ences of their constituencies. They will then represent the more communitarian prefer-
ences that the majority of global citizens hold (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014; Furia, 2005).
How these mechanisms play out is an important question for the potential of creating 
a democratic global parliament. If plenary debate adequately reflects societal divisions, 
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then democratizing the UNGA is not likely to change the balance on this cleavage. The 
divided elite will then remain divided. If, however, international assemblies feature a 
cosmopolitan elitist bias unless forced to represent communitarian positions through 
mechanisms of delegation and accountability, then democratizing them should funda-
mentally alter the balance of power between cosmopolitan voice and its opposition.
Data and method
This section explains our case selection of the EP and the UNGA, and the sampling of 
debates in five policy areas. Subsequently, we explain our claims analysis method of data 
collection and the choice for weighted metric multidimensional unfolding (WMMDU) to 
gauge dimensionality in these issues and how representatives relate to it.
Case selection: Approximating two international assemblies
We study public plenary debates on globalization issues within the UNGA and in the EP. 
Each forum is the central public deliberative organ of their respective institutional frame-
works. The proceedings of both institutions are publically available online, including 
literal transcripts of debates, adopted resolutions and the voting behaviour of representa-
tives. Finally, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) both deal with a 
wide variety of policy issues related to the phenomenon of globalization (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2014). If there is either cleavage formation or elite consensus emerging beyond 
the state, we expect it to be observable in the debates within these two assemblies.
Yet, although they are both strong publics beyond the state attached to influential 
governance frameworks, the UNGA and the EP differ strongly. They display ample 
variance in the scope of policy issues that are discussed and voted on, powers vis-a-
vis the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary-General or the European Council 
and the European Commission, and on delegation mechanisms. First, the regional 
scope of the EP involves a group of relatively homogeneous member states, which are 
all developed, advanced, industrialized Western democracies. None of them are likely 
to suppress globalization conflict through authoritarian means from finding demo-
cratic expression, and such standards of democracy likely facilitate — or at least do 
not inhibit — the manifestation of conflict at the supranational level. The UN’s mem-
bership is heterogeneous, including democracies and authoritarian states, rich and 
poor, deeply internationalized open societies and autarkic states. Even if there is soci-
etal conflict about globalization in all UN member states, it is likely that some coun-
tries suppress it from manifesting itself in public debates. Second, the UNGA and the 
EP differ in formal powers. The EP holds major decision-making power in the 
European legislative process, even more so after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force in 2009 (Hofmann, 2009). The UNGA’s central task, in contrast, is to create an 
international deliberative space. Its adopted resolutions are not legally binding. 
Nevertheless, it also has decision-making power with regard to the UN budget and 
other formalities, such as the establishment of new UN bodies. Despite its non-bind-
ing resolutions and the representation of each state by one single government dele-
gate, the UNGA comes closest to the ideal of a representative democratic institution 
at the global level (Peterson, 2007: 98). Its authority can best be understood in 
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relation to its political impact as a communication forum (Heideking, 2000: 182). 
Third, both institutions differ strongly in their delegation and accountability mecha-
nisms. While the EP is composed of representatives directly elected by European citi-
zens based on the principle of digressive proportionality, the UNGA features one 
single diplomatic representative per member state, delegated by the respective gov-
ernments. Consequently, the chains of delegation and, hence, links to citizens are 
much more distant in the case of the UNGA than in the case of the EP. Moreover, due 
to proportional representation, there is more heterogeneity in the political spectrum in 
the EP, with political parties that are domestically in opposition — absent in the 
UNGA — strongly present.
A democratic World Parliament would likely be closer to the current EP in two respects 
out of these three key differences between the UNGA and the EP. First, it would likely 
have more powers than the current UNGA. Second, it would feature more plural and 
direct representation through the election or selection of multiple representatives per state, 
while, however, the degree of proportionality is an open question of institutional design.
Sampling of debates on five policy issues
In order to analyse the presence and strength of cosmopolitan positions and conflict with 
anti-globalization voice, we chose a variety of policy issues all related to the wider debate 
on globalization. Each of our chosen issue areas signifies a very different aspect of glo-
balization: climate change, human rights, migration and trade. In the case of the EP, we 
also include the issue of European integration since it is regarded as a central component 
of the globalization cleavage in Europe (cf. Kriesi et al., 2012). While these issues vastly 
differ in terms of complexity, the nature of the societal problem and the degrees of estab-
lished global governance, they each relate to a different commodity that crosses state 
borders: pollutants, norms, people, goods and political authority, respectively. Preferences 
on these issues can, hence, either support open borders, international integration and the 
application of international norms and responsibility, or support the closure of borders, 
autarky or a retraction from international norms (Held et al., 1999; Zürn, 1998).
For the analysis, documents were sampled with keyword searches on the issue areas 
in the online archives of the UNGA and the EP. Documents were chosen at random from 
the hits for each year so as to ensure an equal distribution across time. The result was a 
sample aiming to avoid a bias in the claims stemming from the dominance of a specific 
event in a particular year. The time frame of the analysis (2004–2011) was selected to 
include two different legislative periods (before and after the 2009 elections) in the EP. 
Consequently, it reduces the impact of the specific composition of the EP on the results 
of the analysis, as well as diversifying partisan influence. In the case of the UNGA, the 
chosen time frame also has the advantage of including speeches made by different gov-
ernments of the same country in some cases. This reduces the influence of a single party 
on the positions of a state uttered in the UNGA.
Claims as units of analysis
The chosen method of claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham, 1999) provides us with 
the opportunity to map positions by UNGA and EP representatives in the sampled debates 
in a comparative fashion. Generally, a claim is defined as a:
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unit of strategic action in the public sphere which articulate[s] political demands, decisions, 
implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or 
potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in a 
policy field. (Statham, 2005: 12)
A total of 2038 claims made by representatives of both institutions were analysed, with 
1293 claims made in the EP and 745 made in the UNGA (for a complete overview of 
the data set, sampling strategy, coding instructions and intercoder reliability, see De 
Wilde et al., 2014). The method of claims analysis has the advantage that it systemati-
cally opens up the possibility of focusing on the relationship between the actors and the 
position taken in a specific issue area. While some information that cannot be trans-
ferred into an a priori existing coding scheme is lost, the method allows for the aggre-
gation of qualitative information in rigorous fashion, given a clear research question 
and respectively chosen codes. In the analysis to assess the relationship between trans-
national representatives and the position they articulate in the four issue areas, we 
code: WHO is making the claim (claimant: function, nationality and party affiliation); 
WHAT topic is being discussed (issue); and the claimant’s POSITION on this issue 
(position) (cf. De Wilde, 2011: 678).
In order to ensure the replicability of the analysis and the reliability of the results, 
intercoder reliability tests were performed. For each of the potential claims, the majority 
was taken as the norm and the minority as deviation. Of the total 637 decisions, 146 were 
minority decisions. This corresponds to a unitizing reliability correlation of .88, which 
clearly meets reliability requirements. The reliability of all variables used in the analysis 
is well above a threshold of agreement of .7 (Lombard et al., 2002: 593).
We focus on position as the central variable to identify the political demands of 
claimants with regard to the opening or closure of borders in the particular issue area 
in order to map the existence of cosmopolitan versus communitarian conflict, and 
possible coalition and cleavage formation. An ‘integrate’ position indicates that the 
claimant is supporting further integration in the issue area relative to the status quo, 
and either demands the opening of borders or wants to preserve the already open 
borders. An example would be a claim made by the Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP), Roselyne Lefrancois: ‘I would like to say a few words about our 
future action on immigration. … I hope that the political will to support a welcoming 
Europe will be as strong as it was to defend fortress Europe’ (MEP Lefrancois, 
quoted in European Parliament, 2008). This claim indicates the respective issue area 
that the claimant is referring to — ‘migration’ — and the direction of the political 
demand made by the claimant — ‘support a welcoming Europe’ — as advocating 
integration. Integration, in this sense, encompasses any kind of interaction facilitat-
ing the free flow of people, goods, norms or mitigation measures against pollutants; 
it can encompass legal agreements, the negotiation of common standards and poli-
cies, or adherence to any kind of internationally accepted institution, as well as par-
ticipation in international organizations. A preference for such integration logically 
follows from a moral cosmopolitan position, understanding each human individual 
as equal because they should then be universally enabled to enjoy the opportunities 
of globalization (like the opportunity to migrate or to trade) and globally protected 
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from its adverse effects (like global warming).2 Demarcation advocates denounce 
cross-border cooperation and integration, or defend a non-integrated status quo, for 
example: ‘The UK Independence Party will re-establish Britain’s border controls and 
take back the right to say who shall enter our country’ (MEP Clark, quoted in 
European Parliament, 2004). This, too, is a claim on migration — ‘who shall enter 
the country’ — and clearly opposes the existing openness of the UK’s borders 
through a call to ‘re-establish Britain’s border controls’, therefore advocating demar-
cation. Such demarcation claims imply a reassertion of sovereignty bound to territo-
rially restricted areas, such as the nation-state or a specific region.
When a claim does not include a clear policy preference in terms of integration or 
demarcation, we used a third intermediary code of ‘problem’, which signifies that the 
claimant identifies the issue as of major societal importance to be addressed but does 
not indicate a clear direction with regard to the openness of borders, for example: 
‘The global physical environment continues to deteriorate, with increasing evidence 
that climate change is reaching a tipping point, with potentially devastating conse-
quences for the world’s poor’ (UNGA Representative of Lithuania, quoted in United 
Nations, 2007: 3). The mere mentioning of an existing problem, ‘climate change’ and 
the reference to ‘consequences’ signifies that Lithuania considers this an issue deserv-
ing of attention but does not point to more concerted (integration) or more demarcated 
action in response to the identified problem. Hence, the position is coded as ‘prob-
lem’. It follows that the ordinal position variable contains three categories: integrate 
(pro-permeable borders), problem (demand for attention, without direction) and 
demarcate (pro-closed borders).3 For more detailed information about the coding cat-
egories, instructions and additional examples, please see our online codebook (De 
Wilde et al. 2014).
Mapping potential cleavage patterns using multidimensional unfolding
To investigate the existence of cleavages and cleavage coalitions in both forums, we 
conduct WMMDU. Such a technique allows the dimensional mapping of ‘distances’ 
between two different units (Borg and Groenen, 2005) — in our case, representatives and 
their claims on the five issues. It is a variant of multidimensional scaling (MDS) tech-
niques, where unfolding is used for distance matrices between unequal objects (claim-
ants and issues, in our case), while MDS is used for symmetrical matrices between the 
same objects (e.g. claimants and other claimants). Since we measure the distance between 
claimants and issues, unfolding — rather than scaling — is the right method.
First, we aggregated the claims data to the level of country in the UNGA and the com-
bination of country and party family in the EP, calculating mean positions from +1 (inte-
gration) to −1 (demarcation) per issue. These were then converted into proximities to the 
ultimate integrationist and demarcationist poles. In the analysis, distances to issue poles 
are weighted by the amount of claims each claimant makes on that issue, where the same 
number is taken for integrationist and demarcationist pole proximities. The weighting 
means that claimants with more claims have a higher impact on the solution, reflecting 
their stronger influence — in simple quantitative terms — on the overall discourse. 
Furthermore, the issues on which these claimants make many claims also have a stronger 
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effect on the solution, reflecting the difference in salience among the issues overall, and 
the difference in salience of issues to different claimants.
The subsequent WMMDU analysis was executed using the PREFSCAL algorithm 
available in SPSS, which, in relation to other forms of unfolding, successfully limits 
degeneracy (Busing et al., 2005). Degeneracy occurs if claimants with the same proximi-
ties to one of the poles would be located at different locations in the graph, reflecting 
multiple equally good solutions. The PREFSCAL algorithm has the additional major 
advantage that the assumption that the order of preferences is linear can be relaxed 
(Busing et al., 2010). Given the quasi-linear nature of the proximities, this accurately 
reflects the original data. The stress levels in the final solution are slightly higher than 
under the linear assumption as smaller differences in proximities are given compara-
tively higher weight in the solution than large differences. The measure of Kruskal’s 
Stress-I subsequently rises as the proximity of an object in the solution differs from its 
raw proximity in the matrix, but it remains acceptable given the high ratio of objects 
placed in the solution compared to its dimensionality.
Findings
As the results presented in the following show, there are major parallels in the observed 
patterns of positioning in both the UNGA and the EP, suggesting that claims-making on 
globalization issues in international assemblies follows an overarching logic. We present 
structured in-case comparisons documenting both the existence of conflict over globali-
zation issues as a potential cleavage (expectation 1) and the predominance of pro- 
integration arguments over pro-demarcation arguments, that is, a cosmopolitan bias 
(expectation 2). To substantiate these expectations, we present the nature of systematic 
coalition formation on the issues within the two forums using WMMDU analysis. 
Subsequently, comparing the positions of UNGA and EP representatives and the posi-
tions of elected MEPs with those of unelected Commission members within the EP ple-
nary, we analyse whether elected representatives defend less cosmopolitan positions than 
non-elected representatives (expectation 3). Finally, we assess the effect of proportional 
representation within the EP by comparing the positions of different party groups within 
it (expectation 4).
Existence and nature of globalization conflict in the UNGA and EP
That globalization issues are debated and contested in both the UNGA and the EP is 
shown by an average of 17 and 35 claims per plenary transcript, respectively. That is, in 
the plenary debates, representatives actively make demands about either the opening up 
or the closure of borders. The distribution of claims in favour and against integration 
shows overall claims-making in both institutions is clearly pro-integrationist. The mean 
position (min. –1, max. 1) across all issue areas in the EP is .47 compared to a mean of 
.7 of all claims made in the UNGA. Thus, we find evidence supporting the expectation 
that conflict about globalization issues is mobilized within international organizations 
(expectation 1). At the same time, there is support for a cosmopolitan bias in this conflict 
in both institutions (expectation 2). More subtle similarities and differences are revealed 
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when assessing positions on the issue areas in the sample separately. The debate about 
human rights is extremely cosmopolitan in both forums, with means of .85 and .89. In 
other words, representatives in the UNGA or the EP hardly challenge the applicability or 
the need to enforce human rights around the globe publicly. In contrast, the only excep-
tion to the strong cosmopolitan dominance is the debates on trade within the EP, where 
the mean position is below .0 (see Figure 1).
In a second step, we assessed the degree of conflict in the two institutions and the 
different issue areas. Conflict could be evaluated, first, in terms of the mere presence of 
two opposing preferences voiced or, second, by the ‘depth’ of the conflict. In this 
respect, one could either measure the distance between the positions or relate the bal-
ance between pro-integrationist and pro-demarcationist positions compared to each 
other. In our case, the distance between the positions is somewhat static as we work with 
a fixed threefold indicator for position (demarcate, problem and integrate). For this 
reason, the measurement of conflict relies on the comparison of the relative frequency 
with which pro-integrationist and pro-demarcationist arguments are made. We operate 
with a measurement of depth of conflict that relies on a division of the number of the 
less frequent position (either demarcate or integrate) by the number of the most frequent 
position, receiving a measure between 0 and 1 — 0 indicating the total absence of con-
flict and 1 indicating maximum polarization.
Table 1 provides further evidence for the existence of conflict over globalization, 
while also showing that the four issue areas differ markedly regarding the degree of 
polarization. Trade presents the most polarized issue area in both institutions, followed 
by migration. Whereas the degree of polarization is much higher in the EP in both issue 
areas, the overall ordering of the issue areas according to the depth of conflict is compa-
rable. In other words, human rights and climate change are treated as valence issues: 
there is no consensus on their salience so conflict exists between those attributing 
0.47
0.85
0.57
0.42
-0.23
0.46
0.7
0.89
0.56
0.64
0.58
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Overall Human Rights Climate 
Change
Migration Trade European 
Integration
EP
UNGA
Figure 1. Mean positions overall and per issue area.
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salience to them and those who do not, rather than a contest over which policy to pursue 
(Green, 2007). Once representatives accept as a fact that human rights exist and are 
violated, the argument that something needs to be done about violations almost immedi-
ately follows. No one argues that human rights are violated and that this is a good thing. 
Instead, those who do not want to act against human rights violations either keep silent 
or argue that there are no human rights violations to begin with. In contrast, positional 
conflicts over migration and trade feature opposing policy demands. Some representa-
tives argue in favour of free migration or more free trade, while others demand the exact 
opposite.
Meanwhile, both sides acknowledge that these issues are important and should be of 
common concern. As evidenced by the mean positions and the degree of polarization on 
these various policy issues, there is striking similarity between the UNGA and the EP in 
terms of which issues are valence issues and which are positional. Differences also 
remain, with stronger polarization in the EP than in the UNGA, to which we will return 
in the discussion.
Overall, this analysis shows that claimants in the EP are more likely to engage in 
conflictual claims-making on globalization issues and to defend opposing positions, 
whereas the UNGA delegates display a large degree of homogeneity on pro-integration 
claims. Yet, even in the UNGA, there are conflictual issue areas. They might be very 
unbalanced, but conflict is still present. On the other hand, even though the EP features 
significant conflict, there are exceptions, such as the human rights issue, where a cosmo-
politan consensus dominates.
Substantiating potential cleavage formation in the assemblies: WMMDU 
analysis
To further investigate patterns in conflict, we investigate coalition formation in both 
assemblies. We ask: do we find groups of representatives that collectively advance or 
oppose either integration or demarcation on one or more of our policy fields? The 
answer to this question helps, first, to assess the plausibility of the mobilization of a 
cleavage around globalization issues, which systematically divides groups of repre-
sentatives at international level. Second, it can help us assess our counterfactual on the 
effects of democratizing the UNGA or creating a new World Parliament by relating 
coherent cosmopolitan and communitarian positions to specific actors or coalitions. 
Here, we are interested not only in the extent of coalition formation on each of the five 
issues, but also in whether a coalition that advocates or opposes integration on one issue 
does the same on other issues, suggesting a more systematic division in the form of a 
Table 1. Measure of conflict overall and per issue area.
Overall Climate 
Change
Human 
Rights
Migration Trade European 
Integration
EP .29 .17 .02 .30 .56 .30
UNGA .06 0 .02 .12 .15 –
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cleavage. To trace this, we map coalition formation and issue linkage and present our 
findings from the WMMDU.
Figures 2 and 3 visualize the results of the WMMDU — they show the issue poles as 
black dots and the claimants as white dots. Mean positions of the Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), G77 and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) countries in the UNGA4 and the party families in the EP5 are indicated by large 
white dots. Also, the graphs were inverted and/or rotated where necessary so that the hori-
zontal X-axis reflects economic integration, with the integration pole of trade (Ti) to the 
right of the demarcationist pole (Td), and the vertical Y-axis reflects cultural integration, 
where the migration integration pole (Mi) is located above the migration demarcationist 
pole (Md) (cf. Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012), thereby facilitating comparison between the 
UNGA and EP solutions. Poles were not fixed so as not to make the apriori assumption that 
the issues of trade and migration are non-correlated, reflected in orthogonal dimensions. As 
both solutions show, however, they are, in fact, fairly orthogonal.
Figure 2. Joint plot of WMMDU in the UNGA.
Notes: Kruskal’s Stress-I: .205, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .818.
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In the case of the UNGA, we find that the vast majority of state representatives are 
located in the vicinity of the cosmopolitan poles on human rights (HRi), migration 
(Mi) and trade (Ti). A few disperse outliers including Russia, Tajikistan and Trinidad 
and Tobago are located closely to the communitarian poles on human rights (HRd) 
and trade (Td). Sierra Leone approaches the communitarian migration pole (Md). The 
fact that most states are located around the cosmopolitan poles visualizes the strong 
dominance of cosmopolitan discourse in the UNGA. To a limited extent, we find sup-
port for the notion that there is a conflict between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ in the 
UNGA (Voeten, 2000) as ‘the West’ — with the exception of Israel — is unified 
around the cosmopolitan center, while ‘the Rest’ is widely dispersed across both the 
cosmopolitan center and the communitarian poles. Rather than resembling a North 
versus South conflict, however — as operationalized in the group of countries that are 
members of the OECD and the G77 — the ‘Rest’ opposing ‘the West’ is primarily the 
former East, as operationalized in the CIS. Still, cleavage formation in terms of 
Figure 3. Joint plot of WMMDU in the EP.
Notes: Kruskal’s Stress-I: .187, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .802.
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opposing coalitions mobilizing each camp clearly remains limited in the UNGA dis-
course, and even the comparatively demarcationist CIS countries are located fairly 
close to all integrationist issue poles.
In the case of the EP, this is clearly different. First of all, we find a one-dimensional 
constellation of issues, with the cosmopolitan poles of migration (Mi), European integra-
tion (EUi) and climate change (CCi) located together, and, similarly, their opposites (Md, 
EUd and CCd) together. Furthermore, while all party groups are obviously diffuse in 
terms of their member parties’ positions, there is a clear pattern of their mean positions 
being organized along this one dimension. In this respect, it makes sense to speak of the 
existence of a cleavage systematically mobilizing cosmopolitan and communitarian 
positions. Closest to the cosmopolitan poles on these three issues we find the Greens fol-
lowed closely by the social democratic Socialism and Democracy (S&D) group. Moving 
towards the middle of this dimension, we find the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 
Europe (ALDE) and the socialist Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic 
Green Left (GUE-NGL), then come the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) and 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and, finally, closest to the communitar-
ian poles, we find the Far Right Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). All 
of these parties are close to the human rights cosmopolitan pole, indicating a lack of 
positional conflict on this issue. Trade turns out as an orthogonal and subordinate 
dimension.
Normally, Kruskal’s Stress-I levels of .2 or lower are considered acceptable (Borg 
and Groenen, 2005: 48). However, given the high number of cases that clearly exceed 
10 times the amount of dimensions in the solution, we accept Kruskal’s Stress-I lev-
els of just over .2 as adequate. Note further that non-degeneracy levels are remark-
ably high, well above the usually applied threshold of .7. We therefore accept these 
solutions as both theoretically and methodologically adequate representations of 
reality.
These findings imply that conflict formation on globalization — at least as mani-
fest at the international level — does not primarily concern itself with globalization 
understood as free trade, international production and neoliberal doctrine, but instead 
relates to various facets of open, permeable borders (Held et al., 1999). In fact, the 
most orthodox issue related to globalization — trade — apparently does not even 
constitute a component of the main conflict in the EP, which instead builds on con-
flict over other international issues, such as climate change, migration and European 
integration. On the other hand, trade is the most contested issue in both assemblies 
in terms of the mean position advocated by all claimants. In the EP, unlike in the 
UNGA, we find a clear representation of alternative positions by the party groups. 
These party groups do not just present fairly coherent positions on these issues irre-
spective of the nationality of the subordinate member party, but they are also spread 
out along the dimension from complete cosmopolitanism to complete communitari-
anism. Arguably, therefore, the majority of citizens — who maintain predominantly 
more communitarian preferences — are better represented in the EP than in the 
UNGA. In the next section, we explore the extent to which democratic accountabil-
ity can account for this.
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Effects of accountability mechanisms
One important finding of the mapping of the debate in both the UNGA and the EP is the 
dominance of pro-integrationist or cosmopolitan claims in both institutions and in all 
issue areas, with the sole exception of the debate on trade in the EP, in line with our 
theoretical expectation 2. We propose that the lack of strong accountability mechanisms 
in international assemblies could be an explanation for this. The results presented here 
support that line of argument because this cosmopolitan dominance is weaker in the EP, 
where stronger accountability mechanisms are in place: whereas the representatives in 
the UNGA are appointed diplomats by nation-state governments that are only very dis-
tantly accountable to citizens — even if the state is a fully functioning democracy — 
MEPs are directly elected by EU citizens. Our findings show that these distantly 
accountable representatives in the UNGA make more cosmopolitan claims than their 
directly accountable counterparts in the EP (for all policy issues). The fact that this pat-
tern holds across a wide range of issues lends strong support to expectation 3. To further 
substantiate our argument that the strength of accountability mechanisms matters and 
that the observed pattern is not just the function of the empowerment or regional nature 
of the EP, we present an intra-case comparative analysis within the EP debates, thus 
holding the institutional setting constant. We compare, first, the positioning of directly 
elected MEPs to those of more distantly accountable members of the European 
Commission to the extent that they participate in plenary debates within the EP.
Both directly elected MEPs and more distantly accountable members of the European 
Commission engage in claims-making in the EP. Members of the European Commission 
are regularly called to the EP to account for their actions in plenary, not unlike government 
members accounting for their actions in their parliaments in national parliamentary democ-
racies. Our study has also documented the claims made by Commissioners to the extent 
that they are made in the plenary of the EP within our sampled transcripts of debates. 
Commissioners are appointed by the member states’ governments, and can thus be seen 
more as state delegates than as citizen representatives, even if their task is to defend the 
European interest, rather than the national interest. Whichever interest they consider them-
selves to be representing, which is beyond the present study to find out, they are not as 
directly accountable to citizens as MEPs are because they do not face direct elections.
Table 2 shows that members of the Commission clearly make more pro-integrationist 
claims than MEPs. This supports our expectation that it is the strength of accountability 
mechanisms that account for variance in claims-making since we control for the powers 
of the organization and its geographical scope. Even though these results need to be 
interpreted with caution due to the discrepancy in the number of claims in the two 
Table 2. Mean position for Commissioners and MEPs across issue areas.
Position
 Mean Count
Commissioners .68 63
MEPs .45 1180
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categories of speakers, the results support our expectation 3. An independent samples 
T-test reveals that the difference between the mean positions of Commissioners and 
MEPs is significant (Sig. 2-tailed: .024).
Effects of proportional representation
In order to assess expectation 4 regarding the effects of proportional representation on the 
degree of cosmopolitan bias, we perform a second intra-case comparison within the EP. 
Proportional representation has the effect of including a larger diversity in the party spec-
trum, and we expect that representatives of opposition and fringe parties will systemati-
cally hold different — and particularly more communitarian — positions than mainstream 
or government parties (cf. Hix and Lord, 1997). For this reason, we compare the positions 
of mainstream parties in the EP to the claims by the MEPs from fringe opposition parties. 
The latter’s presence in the EP is largely a function of the multimember electoral districts 
— proportional representation — in the European electoral system.
The mean positions per party family support our expectation, especially when looking 
at the Far Right party family and their overall demarcationist positioning (–.33), which 
deviates considerably from the mean position in the EP. The other fringe group — the 
socialists — join the cosmopolitan mainstream on the issues of climate change, human 
rights and migration, but are relatively more communitarian on the issue of European 
integration, and extremely so on the issue of trade (see Table 3).
Despite a prominent presence of the Far Right in the EP, a bias towards cosmopolitan-
ism prevails. When looking at the human rights issue area, we see that even the mean posi-
tion of the Far Right party family is integrationist (.53). Whereas the socialist party shows 
the second most demarcationist mean position across all issues (.37), it nevertheless leans 
towards integration in absolute terms. Looking at the mean position in the different issue 
areas, the picture becomes even more diverse, with the socialists having one of the most 
integrationist positions in the human rights issue area and, at the same time, the most 
demarcationist when it comes to trade. Consequently, it is difficult to speak generally of a 
communitarian position in response to globalization. Still, the mean positions of claims by 
Table 3. Mean position per party family, overall and per issue area.
Overall Climate 
Change
Human 
Rights
Migration Trade European 
Integration
EFDD (Far Right) −.33b −.38 .53a −.50a −.30a −.45b
EPP and ECR 
(Conservatives)
.43b .58a .78b .38b −.07a .42b
ALDE (Liberals) .61b .63 .86b .59a −.11a .70b
Greens .57b .78 .93a 1.00a −.61a .88a
S&D (Social Democrats) .74b .73a .93b .71b −.13a .81b
GUE-NGL (Socialists) .37b 1.00 .93a .58a −.70a .35a
Overall .47b .57b .85b .42b −.23b .46b
Notes: aMeans computed from 10 to 50 claims. bMeans computed from more than 50 claims.
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the different party families in the EP correspond to the core values of the respective party 
family: the greens are most integrative when it comes to climate change; the liberals advo-
cate open borders in the trade issue area. We also find a moderate correlation 0.190** (Sig. 
2-tailed: .000; N: 1277) between a position taken by a claimant and the respective party 
family. In sum, our results provide evidence to support the expectation that proportionality 
in the election system results in more communitarian voices within a transnational parlia-
ment, at least in the European case. Such effects of institutional design need to be assessed 
carefully when evaluating the creation of a global parliament.
Limitations and alternative explanations
Our research design certainly suffers from limitations, which is why we refrained from 
performing rigid hypothesis testing. It was devised to provide a setting to evaluate the 
counterfactual of how the creation of a global parliament may be expected to play out. 
Our case selection of the EP and the UNGA is, hence, clearly a second-best option. Due 
to their various dimensions of variation other than direct election, alternative explana-
tions cannot be ruled out.
It may be argued, for instance, that the nature of European governance to which the 
MEPs relate is different (i.e. much more integrated) than the global governance that UNGA 
members relate to. Since the EU already features high levels of integration, it may be simul-
taneously less advantageous to demand even more integration, and easier to pinpoint and 
criticize aspects of policy where integration has created negative side effects. It is, however, 
likely that a democratized UNGA or a new democratic World Parliament would not only be 
more directly accountable to the world’s citizens, but also gain significant policy powers in 
a newly reinvigorated system of global governance. A democratically elected parliament 
beyond the state will not generate much legitimacy unless it has a meaningful say in policy-
making. Similarly, directly elected parliamentarians in a new World Parliament are likely to 
claim the mandate to have strong policy influence, comparable to the behaviour of the EP in 
the way that it has gradually claimed significant powers since its creation (Rittberger, 2005). 
In that sense, this alternative explanation still brings the same lessons to those considering 
democratizing the UNGA. Through a combination of empowerment and democratization, 
which such institutional reform would entail, a stronger communitarian counter-voice is 
likely to enter the assembly, balancing its otherwise cosmopolitan bias.
Nevertheless, the European case is an imperfect trial space given the strong cultural 
homogeneity — compared to the whole world — the relatively unified party system and 
the fact that only democracies are included. Our results inform the debate on constituting 
a global parliament, but only the actual experiment is ultimately capable of answering 
the questions of how global democracy will play out and to what extent it would bring 
about cosmopolitan policies.
Conclusion
One might expect that MEPs act as agents of cosmopolitanism in comparison to the gov-
ernment delegates of the UNGA. After all, they all hail from Western liberal democracies, 
are directly elected on a supranational mandate and do not have to represent the interests 
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of the state apparatus. The findings we present in this article, however, do not support such 
an expectation.
First, we show that conflict around globalization issues is mobilized (to some degree, 
in a one-dimensional manner) in both international assemblies, potentially constituting a 
new cleavage. This plays out to varying degrees in the two assemblies: our WMMDU 
analysis shows how the party groups in the EP are aligned along a single dimension on 
the issues of climate change, migration and European integration. There is partisan 
mobilization along the communitarian versus cosmopolitan dimension, with the greens 
vocalizing the most cosmopolitan position, the Far Right vocalizing the most communi-
tarian position and all other party groups in between. However, this does not hold for 
trade — the classical globalization issue — which constitutes a different dimension in 
our results. In contrast, a similarly clear and divisive mobilization of the cleavage is lack-
ing in the UNGA, where Western countries, with the exception of Israel, occupy a fairly 
coherent cosmopolitan mainstream but all other countries are widely dispersed between 
the cosmopolitan mainstream and various communitarian outlier positions.
Second, we showed that there is a cosmopolitan bias in both assemblies studied, 
although this is stronger within the UNGA. Third, by way of comparing the positions of 
elected and non-elected representatives, both between the assemblies and within the EP, 
we showed that stronger accountability mechanisms plausibly strengthen communitarian 
voice. Future studies should try to isolate further the effects of delegation mechanisms on 
the representation of cosmopolitan and communitarian positions. Vote analysis, content 
analysis of policy output or elite surveys of international organizations’ staff could com-
plement our findings and test this hypothesis further.
Fourth, we showed that installing a proportional system of representation is likely to 
increase the degree to which communitarian positions are expressed. Our evidence from 
an intra-case study of partisan positions within the EP testifies to this. Opposition and 
fringe parties within the EP hold systematically more communitarian positions than rep-
resentatives of mainstream parties. Proportional representation allows a stronger pres-
ence of such fringe parties. This result may be particular to the European case, and may 
arguably even be reversed in authoritarian countries, if it is the case that the opposition 
is systematically more cosmopolitan within them. Still, the question of the effects of the 
voting system is of major importance for the debate on creating a World Parliament 
(Archibugi, 2010; Cohen and Sabel, 2006; Held, 2010).
Our findings carry significant implications for these discussions. As other scholars 
have shown (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014; Furia, 2005), cosmopolitanism is a ‘minority ideol-
ogy’ among world citizens. The majority — in Europe, inclined to vote for Far Right 
populist parties, socialist parties or conservative parties — constitutes a communitarian 
core. The fact that these citizens are numerous and their interests are affected by the poli-
cies enacted by international organizations poses the question of whether they are repre-
sented in strong publics beyond the state. This is paramount from a perspective of 
democratic legitimacy that considers the principles of representative democracy to be 
somehow applicable to global governance. The strong cosmopolitan bias in the discourse 
of formal representatives in the UNGA and — to a more limited extent — the EP docu-
mented in this study do not, from this perspective, bode well. It means a significant part 
of citizens’ preferences are not represented well enough in international organizations.
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If the EP provides any glimpse into the empirical reality of a would-be World Parliament 
or a democratized and empowered UNGA, then we can expect a much stronger communi-
tarian counter-voice to the cosmopolitan bias should such institutional reforms be enacted. 
More direct accountability mechanisms will likely force representatives to deviate less 
from the communitarian preferences of citizens than they currently do in the UNGA. If 
global elections were to be second-order to a similar extent that the European elections 
currently are, then the likelihood that communitarians enter into this would-be assembly 
would present itself even stronger. This is because opposition and fringe parties tend to do 
disproportionally well in second-order elections (Van der Brug and Van der Eijk, 2007), 
and these are exactly the parties most likely to voice communitarian positions.
A more powerful communitarian counter-voice in global governance that could be the 
result of creating a strong and democratic World Parliament may, subsequently, limit the 
extent to which the UN could enact cosmopolitan policies — assuming that the kind of 
public rhetoric that we have analysed is not disconnected from voting behaviour or other 
policy-formulation mechanisms. Ultimately, cosmopolitan democrats may be forced to 
choose. On the one hand, they could strive for cosmopolitan global governance centred on 
the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern. To ensure respective policies of enforc-
ing human rights, promoting mobility and protecting the global environment, these seem-
ingly need to be enacted by a privileged global elite, safeguarded from direct accountability 
to the public. On the other hand, they could strive to democratize global governance, where 
strong mechanisms of delegation and accountability foster the enactment of the people’s 
will. However, as our findings imply, this likely fosters a more powerful communitarian 
counter-voice that inhibits the cosmopolitan nature of global governance.
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Notes
1. Transcripts of debates and resolutions are freely available online.
2. The relational nature of the claim, which is coded against the status quo as presented by the 
claimant, makes the claims directly comparable across different institutional settings. The 
topics discussed in both assemblies include national, regional and global problems, and in 
each case, the demands of the claimant in respect to his presentation of the current status quo 
are coded in terms of more or less integration.
3. In comparison to the original coding (De Wilde et al., 2014: 34–35), we have collapsed the 
categories of ‘integration’ and ‘keep integrated’ into a single ‘pro-integration’ category, the 
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categories of ‘problem’ and ‘no-problem’ into a single ‘neutral/ambivalent’ middle group, and 
the categories ‘demarcation’ and ‘keep demarcated’ into a single ‘pro-demarcation’ category. 
This is done for reasons of parsimony and does not affect the results.
4. The OECD contains UN member states generally considered to be ‘the West’, including the 
US, Europe and allies; the G77 is the group of developing states; the CIS contains almost all 
countries formerly members of the Soviet Union. Almost all UN member states are a member 
of one and only one of these three groups. Exceptions include, most notably: Tajikistan (both 
CIS and G77) and Chile (both OECD and G77). They are excluded from the calculation of 
mean positions.
5. Party families identified: Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE); European 
Peoples Party and European Conservatives and Reformists (EPP/ECR); Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy (EFDD); Greens–European Free Alliance (GREENS-EFA); Confederal 
Group of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL). Individual parties iden-
tified: Christlich Demokratische Union/Christliche-Soziale Union (cdu/csu), German con-
servatives; Conservative Party, UK (cons); Hungarian conservatives (fidesz); Front National 
(fn), French Far Right party; Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (fpö), Austrian Far Right; 
German greens (gruenen); UK social democrats (labour); Italian far right (lega nord); Die 
Linke (linke), German socialists; Moderata Samlingspartiet (moderata), Swedish conserv-
atives; Miljöpartiet de Gröna (mp), Swedish greens; Il Popolo della Liberta (pdl), Italian 
conservatives; Partit Nazzjonalista (pn), Maltese conservatives; Parti Socialiste (ps), French 
social democrats; Partij van de Arbeid (pvda), Dutch social democrats; Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(pvv, ) Dutch Far Right; Socialni Demokrati (sd), Slovenian social democrats; Socialist Party 
(sp), Irish socialists; Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (spd), German social demo-
crats; Sverigedemokraterna (sve), Swedish Far Right; United Kingdom Independence Party 
(ukip), UK Far Right; Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (ump), French conservatives; 
Vlaamse Liberalen en Demokraten (vld), Belgian liberals.
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